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PARKER: AN INTERPRETIVE SHIFT FOR THE
SUPREME COURT TO ADOPT
I. INTRODUCTION
Composed of twenty-seven words, the text of the Second Amendment provides:
"A well regulated Militia, being necessary to the security of a free State, the right of the
people to keep and bear Arms, shall not be infringed."' Overall, courts have interpreted
this text very narrowly2 as some have found "the common law did not recognize an
absolute right to keep and bear arms." 3 However, the meaning and scope of the Second
Amendment is in dispute, and the debate has recently grown stronger.4 The United
States Supreme Court has never decided whether the Second Amendment protects an
individual or collective right to keep and bear arms, 5 and the last time it furnished any
direct guidance as to what the amendment means was almost seventy years ago in U.S. v.
Miller.6 Although the Miller test has been heavily quoted and cited, there is confusion
among courts and commentators about what it really means.8  One thing that seems
certain is the Second Amendment currently only applies to the federal government and
not the states.
9
On March 9, 2007, in what has been labeled by one journalist as "the most
1. U.S. Const. amend. II.
2. See e.g. Daniel E. Feld, Federal Constitutional Right to BearArms, 37 A.L.R. Fed. 696, 701 (1978).
3. Id. at 700 (citing Burton v. Sills (Burton 1), 248 A.2d 521 (N.J. 1968)).
4. In Silveira v. Lockyer (Silveira 1) the court noted:
A robust constitutional debate is currently taking place in this nation regarding the scope of the
Second Amendment, a debate that has gained intensity over the last several years. Until recently,
this relatively obscure constitutional provision attracted little judicial or scholarly attention. As a
result, however, of increasing popular concern over gun violence, the passage of legislation
restricting the sale and use of firearms, the cultural significance of firearms in American society,
and the political activities of pro-gun enthusiasts under the leadership of the National Rifle
Association... the disagreement over the meaning of the Second Amendment has grown
particularly heated.
312 F.3d 1052, 1060 (9th Cir. 2003); accord e.g. David T. Hardy, A Well-Regulated Militia: The Founding
Fathers and the Origin of Gun Control in America, 15 Win. & Mary Bill Rights J. 1237, 1238-40 (2007);
David B. Kopel, The Supreme Court's Thirty-Five Other Gun Cases: What the Supreme Court Has Said about
the Second Amendment, 18 St. Louis U. Pub. L. Rev. 99, 104-05 (1999).
5. Parker v. Dist. of Columbia (Parker 11), 478 F.3d 370, 391 (D.C. Cir. 2007), cert. granted sub nom.
Dist. of Columbia v. Heller, 128 S. Ct. 645 (2007).
6. See Erwin Chemerinsky, Constitutional Law 13 (2d ed., Aspen 2005) (citing U.S. v. Miller, 307 U.S.
174 (1939)). Justice Douglas took no part in the consideration of this case. Miller, 307 U.S. at 183.
7. 307 U.S. at 178.
8. Feld, supra n. 2, at 708-09.
9. Chemerinsky, supra n. 6, at 466 (citing Presser v. Ill., 116 U.S. 252 (1886)).
1
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important ruling on gun control in 70 years,"' 1 the U.S. Court of Appeals for the District
of Columbia Circuit in Parker v. District of Columbia I (Parker 11) held the Second
Amendment protects an individual right to bear arms. 12 Parker H was the first federal
appellate court to strike down a gun law as an unconstitutional violation of the Second
Amendment, 13 thus encouraging the Supreme Court to grant certiorari on the case to
intervene and revisit Miller.14 The Parker II court reached the correct result, but not
entirely for the reasoning explicitly stated in its opinion; Supreme Court precedent, along
with support for the text of the Second Amendment beyond that accounted for by the
Parker 11 court, exists to support the court's holding. Public policy supports a
straightforward individual rights interpretation of the Second Amendment, and even if it
did not, the constitutional way to reduce the Second Amendment to a "dead letter" is not
by simply applying its text against intent and meaning. Therefore, if any or all of the
plaintiffs in Parker II are determined to have standing and if Parker II is not rendered
moot with the passage of the District of Columbia Personal Protection Act, 15 Parker H
should be affirmed and the Second Amendment interpreted to protect an individual right
to bear arms.
Because Parker II provides a thorough historical and jurisprudential analysis of the
Second Amendment, Part I of this note will provide a brief background of Second
Amendment law, focusing on settled Supreme Court precedent. Part II will state the case
of Parker II including: The relevant facts and parties involved in the case, the procedural
history of the case, as well as the holding and reasoning of both the U.S. District Court
for the District of Columbia (Parker I) and Parker II courts. Part III of this note will
defend the thesis and expand upon selected points of the Parker II court's reasoning.
Part IV will analyze the current state of Parker II and its possible future effects.
II. BRIEF BACKGROUND OF SECOND AMENDMENT LAW
As noted above, there is little Supreme Court precedent on the Second
Amendment. One commentator observed that as of September 1998, the Supreme Court
had mentioned the Second Amendment in twenty-seven opinions, while most of these
references merely incidentally refer to it16 and in twenty-two of them only "the right of
the people to keep and bear Arms" was quoted or paraphrased without mentioning the
10. Pete Williams, Major Ruling against D.C. Handgun Ban, http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/17538139
(Mar. 9, 2007).
11. 478 F.3d at 391.
12. Id. at 395.
13. William W. Van Alstyne, A Constitutional Conundrum of SecondAmendment Commas, 10 Green Bag
469 (2007); Williams, supra n. 10.
14. 307 U.S. 174; see Lyle Denniston, SCOTUSblog, Court Agrees to Rule on Gun Case,
http://www.scotusblog.com/wp/uncategorized/court-agrees-to-rule-on-gun-case/ (Nov. 20, 2007).
15. See Robert A. Levy, Testimony, Oversight Hearing on the District of Columbia's Gun Control Laws
(U.S. H.R. Comm. Govt. Reform, June 28, 2005) (available at http:l/www.cato.org/testimony/ct-
r1062805.html).
16. Christopher J. Schmidt, An International Human Right to Keep and Bear Arms, 15 Win. & Mary Bill
Rights J. 983, 988 (2007) (citing Eugene Volokh, Testimony, Testimony of Eugene Volokh on the Second
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word "Militia." 17  Some view this as no surprise since the fact that the Second
Amendment's protections do not protect ordinary citizen's rights is "'perhaps the most
well-settled point in American law."' 
1 8
The Supreme Court's most recent and direct decision addressing the scope of the
Second Amendment came in Miller.19 Put in the words of one commentator, "Miller
grew out of a 1938 prosecution of two bootleggers ... for ... possessing a sawed-off
shotgun without having paid the required federal tax." 2° Jack Miller and Frank Layton
were indicted for violating the National Firearms Act by unlawfully transporting an
unregistered twelve-gauge double barrel shotgun with a barrel less than eighteen inches
long from Claremore, Oklahoma, to Siloam Springs, Arkansas, "against the peace and
dignity of the United States." 2 1 To be in compliance, the shotgun would have had to
have been registered and accompanied with a stamp-affixed written order. 22
Miller and Layton argued the National Firearms Act both usurped the police power
traditionally reserved to the states and violated their Second Amendment rights.23 This
argument proved successful in the U.S. District Court for the Western District of
Arkansas, where the court sustained Miller and Layton's demurrer and quashed their
indictment. 24  However, the government appealed arguing the Second Amendment
merely protected a collective right to "bear arms" for the common defense, as supported
by the common law. 25 Miller and Layton could not afford counsel so there was neither a
brief filed nor an appearance for them at the Supreme Court, and the government argued
26unopposed. Writing for the Court in Miller, Justice McReynolds, viewed by some as
"one of the worst Supreme Court Justices of the twentieth century, ' 2 7 set out the Miller
test:
In the absence of any evidence tending to show that possession or use of a "shotgun having
a barrel of less than eighteen inches in length" at this time has some reasonable relationship
to the preservation or efficiency of a well regulated militia, we cannot say that the Second
Amendment guarantees the right to keep and bear such an instrument. Certainly it is not
within judicial notice that this weapon is any part of the ordinary military equipment or that
its use could contribute to the common defense.
28
The Miller Court reversed and remanded the case to the lower court for further
17. Volokh, supra n. 16 (internal citations omitted).
18. Kopel, supra n. 4, at 100 (quoting Dennis Henigan, The Right to Be Armed: A Constitutional Illusion,
S.F. Barrister 19 (Dec. 1989) (available at http://www.gunlawsuits.org/defend/second/articles/illusion.php)).
19. Chemerinsky, supra n. 6, at 13.
20. Kopel, supra n. 4, at 105.
21. Miller, 307 U.S. at 175 (citing National Firearms Act, 48 Stat. 1236-40 (1934)).
22. Id.
23. Id. at 176.
24. Id. at 177.
25. Br. for the U.S. at4, Miller, 307 U.S. 174.
26. Miller, 307 U.S. at 175; accord e.g. Kopel, supra n. 4, at 105-06 (also noting that the law at the time of
Miller, the federal government was allowed to take a case directly to the Supreme Court if a federal statute was
found unconstitutional); id. at 106 n. 17; Gura & Possessky, P.L.L.C., DCGunCase.com, Frequently AskedQuestions, http://dcguncase.com/blog/faqs/ (last accessed Mar. 18, 2008).
27. Kopel, supra n. 4, at 106 (citing L.A. Powe, Jr., Guns, Words, and Constitutional Interpretation, 38
Wm. & Mary L. Rev. 1311, 1331 (1997)).
28. Miller, 307 U.S. at 178 (citingAymette v. Tenn., 21 Tenn. 154, 158 (1840)). 3
Lagow: Parker: An Interpretive Shift for the Supreme Court to Adopt
Published by TU Law Digital Commons, 2007
TULSA LA W REVIEW
proceedings because the shotgun in question did not fall within the category of weapons
protected by the Second Amendment when applied to the Court's test.
29
Interpretations of the Second Amendment have been shaped around two basic
models.30  The first is the individual rights model, stating the Second Amendment
guarantees private citizens a right to keep and use firearms for any purpose, subject to
only limited governmental regulations, analogous to other Bill of Rights provisions such
as the First Amendment's right to free speech.3 1 The second is the collective rights
model, stating the Second Amendment protects only the right of state governments to
preserve, maintain, and arm their militias, such as today's National Guard.
32
Stemming from these two basic models, courts3 3 and commentators 34 add sub-
classifications. Under the individual rights model, there is the "standard" model which
stands for the basic individual rights model,3 5 and the "limited" individual rights
model 36 stating the Second Amendment protects an individual right to keep and use
firearms, but only those firearms which have a "reasonable relationship" 37 to militia
use. 38 Under the collective rights model, there is the "traditional" model standing for the
basic collective rights model, 39 and the "sophisticated" collective rights model stating
the Second Amendment only protects the rights of citizens that have a direct relationship
with their state's militia.
40
Across the legal landscape with these models deployed, there is a split among the
states and federal circuits, while a debate still rages among the academic community. In
the federal appellate courts, the Fifth and D.C. Circuits are the only two courts which
have held the Second Amendment protects an individual right to keep and bear arms,
while all other courts have upheld the collective rights view.4 1 Among the states, at least
seven states have held that the Second Amendment protects an individual right to bear
29. Miller, 307 U.S. at 183. The result of Miller on remand against Frank Layton is not reported, while
"Jack Miller was found murdered near Chelsea, Oklahoma on April 6, 1939." Br. of Amicus Curiae NRA Civ.
Rights Def. Fund in Support of Appellants at 14 n. 5, Parker It, 478 F.3d 370.
30. Parker 11, 478 F.3d at 379.
31. Id.; Silveiral, 312 F.3dat 1060.
32. Parker 11, 478 F.3d at 379; Silveira 1, 312 F.3d at 1060; U.S. v. Emerson, 270 F.3d 203, 218 (5th Cir.
2001) (internal citations omitted). David Kopel also recognizes two other views of the Second Amendment,
though unsupported by Supreme Court precedent. The first is advocated by Gary Wills which argues the
Second Amendment was "merely a clever trick that James Madison played on the Anti-Federalists." Kopel,
supra n. 4, at 104 (citing Gary Wills, To Keep and Bear Arms, 42 N.Y. Rev. Bks. 62, 72 (Sept. 21, 1995)). The
second is advocated by David Williams and argues that although the Second Amendment once protected an
individual right, Americans are no longer "the people" as referred to the in the Second Amendment because
they are not "virtuous and united." Kopel, supra n. 4, at 104 (citing David C. Williams, Civic Republicanism
and the Citizen Militia: The Terrifying Second Amendment, 101 Yale L.J. 551 (1991) [hereinafter Williams,
Civic Republicanism]; David C. Williams, The Militia Movement and Second Amendment Revolution:
Conjuring with the People, 81 Cornell L. Rev. 879 (1996) [hereinafter Williams, Militia Movement]; David C.
Williams, The Unitary Second Amendment, 73 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 822 (1998) [hereinafter Williams, Unitary]).
33. See e.g. Emerson, 270 F.3d at 219-20 n. 11 (internal citations omitted).
34. See e.g. Hardy, supra n. 4, at 1239-41.
35. Id. at 1237.
36. Silveiral, 312 F.3dat 1060.
37. Miller, 307 U.S. at 178 (citing Aymette, 21 Tenn. at 158).
38. Hardy, supra n. 4, at 1238 n. 12.
39. Id. at 1237.
40. Emerson, 270 F.3d at 219.
41. See e.g. Parker H, 478 F.3d at 380; Feld, supra n. 2, at 61 (Supp. 2007).
[Vol. 43:793
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arms while at least ten have endorsed the collective rights position.42 One commentator
noted that "eighty-eight law review articles published since 1912 concluded the Second
Amendment secures an individual right, while seventy-six articles published in the same
time frame conclude the amendment secures a collective right.'A
3
III. STATEMENT OF THE CASE
A. Relevant Facts
On February 10, 2003, Shelly Parker, Dick Anthony Heller, Tom G. Palmer,
Gillian St. Lawrence, Tracey Ambeau, and George Lyon (Plaintiffs), filed a complaint in
the Parker I court against the District of Columbia and Mayor Anthony Williams
(Defendants).44 One commentator observed, "the main purpose of the ... litigation was
to bring a test case to the Supreme Court" since "[t]he D.C. gun laws are far more
extreme than those of almost every other U.S. jurisdiction.' '45  Plaintiffs were
represented by the private counsel of Alan Gura, Bob Levy, and Clark Neily who took
this case on a pro bono basis, did not accept funds from any outside sources for their
services, and produced an entirely in-house work product.4
6
Plaintiffs sought declaratory and injunctive relief under 28 U.S.C. §§ 2201, 2202
and 42 U.S.C. § 1983.4 7  They claimed Defendants' gun control laws were an
unconstitutional infringement on their Second Amendment rights.4 8  Specifically,
Plaintiffs challenged D.C. Code § 7-2502.02(a)(4) which generally bars the registration
of handguns while having an exception for retired D.C. police officers; § 22-4504, which
forbids the carrying of a pistol without a license to the extent of preventing a registrant
from transporting a gun within his own home; and § 7-2507.02, which requires lawfully
owned guns to be stored unloaded and disassembled, or bound by a secure device such as
a trigger lock. 49 The Parker II court concluded that "[e]ssentially, the [Plaintiffs] claim
a right to possess.. . 'functional firearms,' by which they mean ones that could be
'readily accessible to be used effectively when necessary' for self-defense in the
home." 50 Plaintiffs' assertion did not extend to outside the home nor did it challenge the
power of D.C. to regulate firearms.
5 1
42. Parker II, 478 F.3d at 380-82 (internal citations omitted).
43. Schmidt, supra n. 16, at 1019 (citing Robert J. Spitzer, Lost and Found: Researching the Second
Amendment, 76 Chi.-Kent. L. Rev. 349, 383 (2000) (article counts valid as of 2000)).
44. Pls.' Compl. at 1-2, Parker v. Dist. of Columbia (Parker]), 311 F. Supp. 2d 103 (D.D.C. 2004).
45. Dave Kopel, D.C. 's Gun Ban: Round 2, America's 1st Freedom 30, 31 (July 2007). One commentator
has further commented on the severity of Defendants' gun laws referring to them as "draconian." Glen Harlan
Reynolds, Looking Ahead: October Term 2007, Cato S. Ct. Rev. 335, 347 (2007).
46. Gurra & Possessky, supra n. 26.
47. Parker If, 478 F.3d at 374.
48. Id. at 373; Pis.' Compl. at 8, Parker1, 311 F. Supp. 2d 103.
49. Parker II, 478 F.3d at 373. For the relevant language of these statutes challenged by Plaintiffs, see
infra nn. 239, 242, 246.
50. Parker II, 478 F.3d at 374.
51. Id. 5
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B. The Parties Involved
Shelly Parker was a D.C. resident and resided in a high crime area. 52  After
becoming involved in her community and trying to make her neighborhood a better place
to live, her life was threatened by a drug dealer while he beat and pried on the front door
to her home. 53 In addition, in 2002, the back window to her car was broken, a large rock
was thrown through the front window of her car, the security camera was stolen from her
home, and a drug user's car was driven into the back fence of her home.54 As a result,
Shelly wished to possess a firearm in her home for self-defense, but under Defendants'
laws could not lawfully do so.
55
Dick Anthony Heller was a D.C. resident who resided in a high crime
neighborhood and was employed as a special police officer by D.C. 56 Pursuant to these
duties, Dick was licensed to carry a handgun while providing security for the federal
judiciary at the Thurgood Marshall Judicial Center in Washington, D.C.5 7 Since Dick
also lawfully owned various other weapons, he applied for permission to possess such
weapons in his home for purposes of self-defense 58 on July 17, 2002,59 but was denied
specifically under D.C. Code § 7-2502.02(a)(4). 60
Tom G. Palmer was a homosexual D.C. resident.6 1  Because of his sexual
orientation, Tom had previously been assaulted and his life threatened while walking to
dinner with a co-worker in another city, but successfully warded off his assailants by
brandishing a handgun.62 He could not have lawfully displayed his handgun in D.C.,
and thus sought to possess a firearm in his home for purposes of self-defense, but under
Defendants' laws could not lawfully do so.
63
Of the three remaining plaintiffs, Gillian St. Lawrence, Tracey Ambeau, and
George Lyon were also D.C. residents. 64 These plaintiffs also lawfully owned various
handguns and sought to possess them in their homes for self-defense purposes.
6 5
Anthony Williams was named as a defendant because of his official capacity as Mayor,
who was responsible for executing and administering the D.C. laws that were alleged
unconstitutional by Plaintiffs.
6 6
52. Pis.' Compl. at 2, Parker 1, 311 F. Supp. 2d 103; Gurra & Possessky, supra n. 26.
53. Levy, supra n. 15; Gurra & Possessky, supra n. 26.
54. Levy, supra n. 15.
55. PI.'s Compl. at 2, Parker 1, 311 F. Supp. 2d 103; Levy, supra n. 15; Gurra & Possessky, supra n. 26.
56. Pl.'s Compl. at 2-3, Parker 1, 311 F. Supp. 2d 103.
57. Id.
58. Id.
59. Pet. for Cert. at app. J, Parker 11, 478 F.3d 370.
60. Parker 11, 478 F.3d at 374.
61. PIs.' Compl. at 3, Parker 1, 311 F. Supp. 2d 103.
62. Id.
63. Id.; Levy, supra n. 15.
64. Pis.' Compl. at 3-4, Parker 1, 311 F. Supp. 2d 103.
65. Id.
66. Id. at 5.
[Vol. 43:793
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C. Parker I
On March 31, 2004, District Judge Sullivan, 67 writing for the Parker I court,
issued a memorandum opinion in response to Plaintiffs' motion for summary judgment
and Defendants' motion to dismiss.68 Plaintiffs' counsel at this stage had not changed,
and representing Defendants were Daniel Rezneck and Johnathan Potter from the Office
of Corporation Counsel in Washington, D.C.
69
After setting out the relevant standard of review, the court began its Second
Amendment analysis by quoting the amendment and Miller test.70 Subsequently, the
court drew from the language of Miller immediately following the Miller test, which
included a discussion by the Miller court about the nature and purpose of the word
"Militia" as used in the Second Amendment at the time of its drafting. 71 The court noted
that due to the Supreme Court's silence on the issue since Miller, a debate had grown
over whether the Second Amendment guarantees a collective right of the states to arm
the militia, a limited individual right to bear arms but only as a member of the state
militia, or an individual right to bear arms for non-militia use.
72
Following its analysis of Miller, the court announced it read Miller in concert with
the majority of federal appellate courts as rejecting an individual right to bear arms for
non-militia use.73  To strengthen this position, the court focused on the fact that the
Supreme Court had two opportunities to re-examine Miller and twice refused to do so.
74
In support of this proposition, the court referenced Lewis v. US.,75 which involved a
67. A biography of Judge Sullivan can be found at http://www.fjc.gov/servlet/tGetlnfo?jid=2312 (accessed
Mar. 18, 2008).
68. 311 F. Supp. 2dat 104.
69. Id. at 103.
70. Id. at 104-05.
71. Id. at 105. The relevant language from Miller the court drew from reads:
The Constitution as originally adopted granted to the Congress power-"To provide for calling
forth the Militia to execute the Laws of the Union, suppress Insurrections and repel Invasions; To
provide for organizing, arming, and disciplining, the Militia, and for governing such Part of them as
may be employed in the Service of the United States, reserving to the States respectively, the
Appointment of the Officers, and the Authority of training the Militia according to the discipline
prescribed by Congress." With obvious purpose to assure the continuation and render possible the
effectiveness of such forces the declaration and guarantee of the Second Amendment were made. It
must be interpreted and applied with that end in view.
The Militia which the States were expected to maintain and train is set in contrast with Troops
which they were forbidden to keep without the consent of Congress. The sentiment of the time
strongly disfavored standing armies; the common view was that adequate defense of country and
laws could be secured through the Militia-civilians primarily, soldiers on occasion.
The signification attributed to the term Militia appears from the debates in the Convention, the
history and legislation of Colonies and States, and the writings of approved commentators. These
show plainly enough that the Militia comprised all males physically capable of acting in concert for
the common defense. "A body of citizens enrolled for military discipline." And further, that
ordinarily when called for service these men were expected to appear bearing arms supplied by
themselves and of the kind in common use at the time.
Miller, 307 U.S. at 178-79.
72. Parker 1, 311 F. Supp. 2d at 105.
73. Id.
74. Id.
75. 445 U.S. 55, 65 (1980). 7
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felon in possession of a firearm being prosecuted for the violation of a criminal statute, 76
and Burton v. Sills,77 which was the dismissal of an appeal to the Supreme Court where
the state court held that the Second Amendment did not protect an individual right to
bear arms. 78 The court concluded that if the Supreme Court interpreted the Second
Amendment as an individual right, it could not have reached the conclusions it did in
these cases.
79
Defendants argued that Plaintiffs had not made any showing that their possession
or use of firearms had some "reasonable relationship" 80 "to the preservation or efficiency
of a well-regulated militia. ' 8 1 On the other hand, Plaintiffs advanced three arguments
before the court. First, they argued that Miller proposed a test to distinguish which
weapons were protected from those not protected under the Second Amendment. 82
Acknowledging that Plaintiffs' arguments were plausible, the court responded that if the
Supreme Court thought Miller was being misinterpreted, it would have taken an
opportunity to correct the misunderstanding at some point during the past sixty-five
years.
83
Second, Plaintiffs argued the Second Amendment established a fundamental right
to bear arms notwithstanding any militia connection. 84 In support of this contention,
they relied heavily on the Fifth Circuit precedent of U.S. v. Emerson.85  The court
paraphrased Emerson as holding that the Second Amendment, though subject to
reasonable restrictions, guarantees an individual right to keep and bear arms as long as
the weapons could have a "conceivable application in the context of a state Militia."
86
The court recognized that Emerson reasoned the Second Amendment to be necessary for
one's self-defense, defense of property, game hunting, and preparation in the event the
state needed assistance to resist the threat of a tyrannical federal government. 87 The
court did not find Plaintiffs' argument or their reliance on Emerson persuasive and even
questioned the validity of Emerson's holding, finding it in conflict with prior Fifth
Circuit precedent. 88 The court pointed out that almost thirty years before Emerson, the
Fifth Circuit twice rejected a criminal defendants' Second Amendment right argument
and upheld their convictions for possessing unregistered sawed off shotguns. 89 The
76. Parkerl, 311 F. Supp. 2dat 105.
77. Burton v. Sills (Burton I1), 394 U.S. 812 (1969).
78. Parker 1, 311 F. Supp. 2d at 105.
79. Id.
80. Miller, 307 U.S. at 178 (citing Aymette, 21 Tenn. at 158).
81. Parker 1, 311 F. Supp. 2d at 104.
82. Id. at 105-06.
83. Id. at 106.
84. Id.
85. Id. (citing Emerson, 270 F.3d 203).
86. Parkerl, 311 F. Supp. 2d at 106.
87. Id. (citing Emerson, 270 F.3d at 260).
88. Id. at 106 (noting that "[t]his change in position by the Fifth Circuit is troubling in light of the Fifth
Circuit's rule that a subsequent panel is precluded from disregarding the holding of an earlier panel unless it is
changed by an en banc decision or by a decision of the United States Supreme Court"). Id. (citing U.S. v.
McFarland, 264 F.3d 557, 559 (5th Cir. 2001); Montesano v. Seafirst Commercial Corp., 818 F.2d 423, 425-
26 (5th Cir. 1987)).
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court therefore rejected Plaintiffs' reliance on Emerson since it found Emerson to be
unstable precedent in light of this change in position.9 ° To strengthen this finding, the
court found it persuasive that since Emerson was the only federal appellate precedent to
hold the Second Amendment protected an individual right to bear arms, Emerson was
therefore isolated and unsteady authority.
9 1
Third, Plaintiffs argued that although the Supreme Court used the correct
interpretation of the term "Militia" in Miller,92 the definition used by present courts is
too narrow. 9 3 Plaintiffs urged the court that rather than a small, state organized group to
resist a tyrannical federal government, the term as used in Miller suggested all able-
bodied men capable of acting for the common defense.94  Acknowledging a recent
Eleventh Circuit opinion which found that Miller suggested the "Militia" as used in the
Second Amendment only referred to actively maintained and well-trained groups,
9 5
Plaintiffs further contended the Framers could not have intended this interpretation
because if the term "Militia" was meant to only give states the right to arm a militia, it
would be in conflict with Article 1, § 8, clause 16 of the Federal Constitution ("Congress
has the power '[t]o provide for ... arming ... the Militia'). 96  Disposing of these
arguments, the court responded that Plaintiffs' interpretation of the Second Amendment
would result in a "free-for-all" and was negated by the plain meaning of the Second
Amendment's language of "a well regulated Militia" which must imply an organized
state group formed as a "fighting force."
97
Covering its bases, the court proceeded to predict that the D.C. Circuit Court of
Appeals would give little merit to Plaintiffs' arguments. 98  The court referenced
Fraternal Order of Police v. U.S.9 9 as precedent where the D.C. Circuit Court of
Appeals, relying on Miller, rejected a Second Amendment argument because there was
no evidence before the D.C. Circuit Court suggesting a relationship of any party to a
militia. 100 The court used this decision to support its prediction that the facts of the case
at hand would likely yield the same result on appeal before the D.C. Circuit Court of
90. Parker 1, 311 F. Supp. 2d at 106-07.
91. Id. at 107 (internal citations omitted).
92. For a discussion of the term "Militia" as defined by the Miller Court, see 307 U.S. at 178-79.
93. ParkerI, 311 F. Supp. 2d at 107.
94. Id. (citing Pis.' Opposition to Defs.' Mot. to Dismiss at 8, Parker 1, 311 F. Supp. 2d 103).
95. Id. (citing U.S. v. Wright, 117 F.3d 1265, 1272 (11 th Cir. 1997)).
96. Id. at 107-08 (citing Pis.' Mot. for S.J. at 32, Parker 1, 311 F. Supp. 2d 103).
97. Id. at 108.
"[E]very word must have its due force, and appropriate meaning; for it is evident from the whole
instrument, that no word was unnecessarily used, or needlessly added. The many discussions which
have taken place upon the construction of the constitution, have proved the correctness of this
proposition; and shown the high talent, the caution, and the foresight of the illustrious men who
framed it. Every word appears to have been weighed with the utmost deliberation, and its force and
effect to have been fully understood."
Parker 1, 311 F. Supp. 2d at 108 (quoting Wright v. U.S., 302 U.S. 583, 588 (1938) (quoting Holmes v.
Jennison, 39 U.S. 540, 570-71 (1840)).
98. Id.
99. 173 F.3d 898 (D.C. Cir. 1999).
100. Parker 1, 311 F. Supp. 2d at 108 (citing Fraternal Or. of Police, 173 F.3d at 906). 9
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Appeals.
101
Wrapping up its findings, the court turned to D.C. Court of Appeals precedent,
although not binding, for persuasive guidance. 10 2 The court referenced Sandidge v.
U.S. 103 for its holding that the Second Amendment merely protects a collective rather
than individual right to bear arms. 104 Although the court acknowledged Plaintiffs'
arguments to be "thought-provoking and historically interesting," it found Plaintiffs had
no plausible claim under the Second Amendment since they submitted no evidence
indicating membership in the militia. 10 5 In conclusion, the Parker I court was strongly
persuaded by the lack of Supreme Court action with respect to the Second Amendment
over the past sixty-five years. 106
The court ultimately held the Second Amendment "protects an individual's right to
'bear arms for service in the Militia,"' but "did not refer to the word 'keep' in the Second
Amendment." 10 7 The court interpreted "Militia" to mean an organized military body
such as today's National Guard. 10 8 Because of this interpretation, the court granted
Defendants' motion to dismiss. 109
D. Parker 1I
Picking up their things and seeking review, Plaintiffs filed a notice of appeal to the
D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals on April 6, 2004, of which they asserted the court had
jurisdiction over their case pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291.110 Parker II was argued
December 7, 2006,111 and decided March 9, 2007, by Senior Circuit Judge Silberman,1 12
who delivered the opinion of the court joined by Circuit Judge Griffith, 113 while Circuit
Judge Henderson dissented.
1 14
Plaintiffs' counsel remained unchanged, however they now had significant amicus
support.115 This support included an amici curiae brief filed from the Attorney General
for the State of Texas, also signed by Attorney Generals from the States of Alabama,
Arkansas, Colorado, Florida, Georgia, Michigan, Minnesota, Nebraska, North Dakota,
Ohio, Utah, and Wyoming. 116  Additional amicus support included the Second
101. Id.
102. Id. at 109.
103. 520 A.2d 1057 (D.C. App. 1987).
104. Parker I, 311 F. Supp. 2d at 109 (quoting Sandidge, 520 A.2d at 1058).
105. Id. at 109-10.
106. Id. at 110.
107. Parker 1l, 478 F.3d at 374.
108. Id.
109. Id.
110. Appellants' Br. at 1, Parker ll, 478 F.3d 370.
111. Parker 1, 478 F.3d at 370.
112. A biography of Chief Judge Silbernan can be found at http://www.fjc.gov/servlet/tGetlnfo?jid=2189
(accessed Mar. 18 , 2008).
113. A biography of Judge Griffith can be found at http://www.fjc.gov/servlet/tGetlnfo?jid=1023 (accessed
Mar. 18, 2008).
114. A biography of Judge Henderson can be found at http://www.fjc.gov/servlet/tGetlnfo?jid=3090
(accessed Mar. 18, 2008).
115. Parker 11, 478 F.3d at 372-73.
116. Id. at 372.
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Amendment Foundation, which was also signed by twelve professors, 117 Congress of
Racial Equality, American Civil Rights Union, and the National Rifle Association
Defense Fund.
1 18
Todd S. Kim, Solicitor General from the Attorney General's Office for the District
of Columbia, argued the case before the court for Defendants. 119 With him on the briefs
were Robert Spagnoletti, Edward Schwab, and Lutz Alexander Prager, who were
additional members from the Attorney General's office. 12  Defendants also had
significant amicus briefs filed on their behalf including Ernest McGill and The Brady
Center for Gun Violence. 12 1  In addition, Attorney Generals from Massachusetts,
Maryland, and New Jersey, along with counsel from the cities of New York, Chicago,
and San Francisco were on the record as amicus in support of Defendants.
122
After a standing analysis, the court held that the only named plaintiff who had
standing to challenge Defendants' gun laws in question was Dick Heller, since he
actually applied for and was denied a registration certificate to own a handgun.
123
Commencing its Second Amendment discussion, the court began by quoting the
amendment and noting that the amendment's second comma divides its two clauses: The
first being the prefatory, and the second being the operative. 124 Plaintiffs conceded the
prefatory clause expresses a civic purpose but argued this purpose does not qualify the
individual right guaranteed by the operative clause. 125 Defendants argued "the prefatory
clause declares the Amendment's only purpose-to shield the state militias from federal
encroachment" as a check on federal power, while the operative clause speaks solely to
military affairs and even when read in isolation, only guarantees a civic right.
126
Noting the two basic models of Second Amendment interpretation, the court
summarized Defendants' interpretation of the amendment as deriving from the
"sophisticated collective right[s] model."12 7 After setting out the split among states,
federal circuits, and noting academic commentary and treatises, 128 the court also
observed that the U.S. Department of Justice had recently adopted the individual rights
interpretation of the Second Amendment. 129 However, because the court concluded that
there was no direct precedent with a square holding for it to follow from the D.C. Circuit
Court of Appeals or Supreme Court, it centered its analysis from the text of the Second
117. Brandeis Br. Filed on Behalf of Amici Profs., Parker 11, 478 F.3d 370. The professors who also signed
the brief include Lloyd R. Cohen, Nicholas J. Johnson, Michael 1. Krauss, Joseph E. Olson, David N. Mayer,
Daniel D. Polsby, Andrew P. Morriss, Glenn H. Reynolds, Dale A. Nance, William A. Schroeder, Robert F.
Turner, and Leonard J. Nelson. Id.
118. Parker 1, 478 F.3d at 372-73.




123. Parker I, 478 F.3d at 376-78.
124. Id. at 378.
125. Id.
126. Id.
127. Id. at 379.
128. Parker 11, 478 F.3d at 380 (internal citations omitted).
129. Id. (citing Memo. Op. for the Atty. Gen., Whether the Second Amendment Secures an Individual Right
(Aug. 24, 2004) (available at http://www.usdoj.gov/olc/secondamendment2.pdf)). 11
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Amendment. 130
Preliminarily, the court responded to the Second Circuit decision U.S. v. Toner
13 1
as referenced by Defendants to defend their collective rights interpretation of the Second
Amendment. 132  Defendants referenced Toner for the proposition that the Second
Amendment protects only a civic right, but the court read Toner as merely holding that
the "right" protected by the amendment was not fundamental. 
13 3
1. The Operative Clause
The court began its analysis by interpreting the meaning of the operative clause.
134
The court noted that when interpreting a disputed constitutional provision, the record of
proceedings that authored the particular provision usually provides helpful guidance. 
135
Unfortunately, the Second Amendment's drafting history is slim and indecisive, but in
the recorded debates available, the First Congress did not reference the operative
clause. 136 From this historical fact, the court inferred that the Second Amendment's
drafters did not dispute the operative clause's individual guarantee. 
137
Building on their argument, Defendants contended hardly any law would violate
the Second Amendment since it was merely a "dead letter," 138 because the "Militia" is
no longer in existence; today's National Guard is fully equipped by the federal
government, creating no need for individual firearm ownership. 139  The court,
unpersuaded, found it strange that if the Second Amendment's sole purpose was as
Defendants contended, the able members of the First Congress would have used different
language such as "'Congress shall make no law disarming the state militias' or "'States
have a right to a well-regulated militia."'
' 140
Stemming from the assertion that the operative clause secures only a civic right
even when read in isolation, Defendants further argued that the singular nature of the
Second Amendment's preamble supports the implication that the operative clause is
conditioned on the prefatory clause. 141 The court responded that when read in context
with other similar state constitutional provisions, the Second Amendment's structure is
not uncommon; it was widespread at the time for prefatory language to declare a positive
governmental theme which was narrower than the operative language used to achieve
it. 142 The court read the Second Amendment in concert with this practice; the prefatory
clause declares the Framers' desire of"a well-regulated Militia," which is narrower than
130. Id. at380-81.
131. 728 F.2d 115 (2d Cir. 1984).





137. ParkerH, 478 F.3d at 391.




142. Parker H, 478 F.3d at 389.
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the operative clause's individual guarantee.
143
Expanding on this observation, the court found the Second Amendment "does not
protect 'the right of the militiamen to keep and bear arms' but rather 'the right of the
people."' 144 As a result, the court read the operative clause as protecting the private
ownership of weapons rather than only ownership connected with the preservation of
state militias, and re-iterated that if the Framers intended otherwise, they would have
chosen different language. 14 5 The court continued to state that placement of the Second
Amendment's civic purpose in the preamble was a perfect way to safeguard the Framers'
view of "a natural right to keep and bear Arms [while] the preservation of the militia was
the right's most salient political benefit-and thus the most appropriate to express in a
political document."'146 In sum, the court concluded the Second Amendment was a
perfect compromise between the Federalists and Anti-Federalists of the First Congress;
the Federalists offered the preamble to "palliate" Anti-Federalist fears of a fading militia,
but neither party thought the government had the power to remove weapons from
citizens. 
14 7
Regarding "the right of the people," Plaintiffs argued this clause clearly establishes
an individual right while "keep and bear Arms" implies private ownership and use.
148
On the other hand, Defendants asserted that "keep and bear Arms" should be read in a
military context rendering the entire meaning of the operative clause as merely a
collective right, while their interpretation of "the right of the people" as to whether this
speaks of a private or civic right was unclear. 149 In response, the court focused on the
word "people" and, for guidance, looked to how the term was used in the First, Fourth,
Ninth, and Tenth Amendments. 150  The court found these amendments were clearly
intended as individual rights to be free from government interference, and the Tenth
Amendment provides a perfect example of the Framers' ability to distinguish between
"the people" and "the states. ' 15 1 Thus, the court inferred an individual right from a
natural reading of the Second Amendment in context with other Bill of Rights
provisions. 152
Defendants argued "the people" referred to a narrower class "of individuals such as
'the organized militia' or 'the people who are engaged in militia service,' or ... Dust]
'the states."' 153 The court responded that such a strained interpretation of "the people"
is completely out of context when read with other amendments in the Bill of Rights that
protect individual rights. 154 Looking to Supreme Court precedent to bolster its position,




147. Parker II, 478 F.3d at 390.




152. Parker H, 478 F.3d at 381.
153. Id.
154. Id. 13
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the court found US. v. Verugo-Urquidez155 to be a helpful and persuasive guide to
interpreting "the people" as used in the Fourth Amendment and other the Bill of Rights:
"[T]he people" seems to have been a term of art employed in select parts of the
Constitution. The Preamble declares that the Constitution is ordained and established by
"the People of the United States." The Second Amendment protects "the right of the
people to keep and bear Arms," and the Ninth and Tenth Amendments provide that certain
rights and powers are retained by and reserved to "the people." While this textual
exegesis is by no means conclusive, it suggests that "the people" protected by the Fourth
Amendment, and by the First and Second Amendments, and to whom rights and powers
are reserved in the Ninth and Tenth Amendments, refers to a class of persons who are part
of a national community or who have otherwise developed sufficient connection with this
country to be considered part of that community. 156
The court found this passage not only helpful when interpreting "the people," but as an
implication to the Supreme Court's view of the Second Amendment, since it was listed
among other provisions in the Bill of Rights that protect individual rights. 157 The court
used this passage to dispose of Defendants' argument as well. 
158
In sum, the court reasoned that "the people," when read in context with other
provisions of the Federal Constitution using the term and in light of Supreme Court
precedent, led to the conclusion that the Second Amendment protects an individual
right. 159 The court found this to be true despite that fact that "the people" was not as all-
encompassing as used today, 16° since the term as used in the Equal Protection Clause of
the Fourteenth Amendment was meant to make up for this initial shortcoming.
16 1
With this in mind, the court reasoned that the operative clause's language indicates
the right to keep and bear arms is preserved, rather than created, by the government.
162
The "right" protected by the Second Amendment pre-existed the Constitution like other
rights in the Bill of Rights, since the Second Amendment has roots in the common law
and English Bill of Rights. 163 Expanding on this point, the court found that this pre-
existing right served to protect the interests of hunting, lawful self-defense, and if
necessary, resistance of a tyrannical government. 164 The Second Amendment was
premised on the idea that private individuals would exercise this right in addition to their
state militia obligations. 1
65
The court acknowledged the collective right argument that the First Congress
155. 494 U.S. 259 (1990).
156. ParkerII, 478 F.3d at 381 (quoting Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. at 265) (internal citations omitted)).
157. Id. at 381-82.
158. Id. at 382.
159. Id.
160. Id. at 382 (citing Robert E. Shalloppe, To Keep and Bear Arms in the Early Republic, 16 Const.
Commentary 269, 280-81 (1999)).
161. Parker II, 478 F.3d at 382.
162. Id (citing Thomas B. McAffee & Michael J. Quinlan, Bringing Forward the Right to Keep and Bear
Arms: Do Text, History, or Precedent Stand in the Way? 75 N.C. L. Rev. 781, 890 (1997)).
163. Id. (citing Robertson v. Baldwin, 165 U.S. 275, 280 (1897); Thomas M. Cooley, The General Principles
of Constitutional Law in the United States ofAmerica 270-72 (Fred B. Rothman & Co. 1981)).
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included the Second Amendment among other individual liberty protections in the Bill of
Rights without comment. 166 The court countered that if this were true, the Second
Amendment would be watered down to an "inexplicable aberration" if this out of context
interpretation were adopted to read the amendment as not protecting an individual
right. 1
67
Regarding Defendants' argument that "keep and bear Arms" should be read as
"purely military language" which merely protects a civic right,168 the court conceded
that "bear Arms" is vulnerable to a military interpretation, but found such an
interpretation to be incorrect. 169 Referencing four dictionaries, 17 one heavily relied on
by the Supreme Court, 17 1 the court noted that "bear" is a synonym for carry, support, or
convey. 172 Thus, the court reasoned that it would be unusual for a writer, either now or
at the time of the Second Amendment's drafting, to use the word "bear" not intending
one of these three definitions.
173
Defendants continued to claim that "'bearing arms' signifies military service
while relying on an unadopted portion of the Second Amendment. 174  The court
admitted that this could be a plausible argument when placed in the appropriate context,
but there were too many instances in which "bear Arms" indicates private use, overriding
a pure military interpretation. 175 To support its position, the court pointed out that at
least Supreme Court Justices Ginsburg, Scalia, and Souter also read "bear Arms" beyond
merely "soldiering:"
Surely a most familiar meaning [of "carries a firearm"] is, as the Constitution's Second
Amendment ("keep and bear Arms") and Black's Law Dictionary... indicate: "wear, bear,
or carry... upon the person or in the clothing or in a pocket, for the purpose... of being
armed and ready for offensive or defensive action in a case of conflict with another
person." 
76
Based on this authority, the court interpreted the operative clause's "bear Arms" in a
private rather than civic sense. 1
77
As a final argument relating to the operative clause, Defendants asserted "keep and
166. Parker ll, 478 F.3d at 383.
167. Id.
168. Id. at 384.
169. Id.
170. Id. (citing Silveira v. Lockyer (Silveira 11), 328 F.3d 567, 573 (9th Cir. 2003) (Kozinski, J., dissenting
from denial of rehearing en banc) (referencing Samuel Johnson, A Dictionary of the English Language (4th ed.
1770); Johnson & Walker's English Dictionaries Combined 126 (J.E. Worchester ed., 1830); Oxford English
Dictionary 20 (J.A. Simpson & E.S.C. Weiner eds., 2d ed., Oxford U. Press 1989); Webster's 1828 Dictionary
(available at http://1 828.mshaffer.com/d/search/word,bear)).
171. Parker 11, 478 F.3d at 384 (citing Eldred v. Ashcrofi, 537 U.S. 186, 199 (2003) (referencing Johnson,
supra n. 170)).




176. Parker 11, 478 F.3d at 385 (quoting Muscarello v. U.S., 524 U.S. 125, 143 (1998) (Ginsburg, J.,
Rehnquist, C.J., Scalia, & Souter, JJ., dissenting) (emphasis in original)).
177. Id. 15
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bear" is a unitary term while "keep" should not have an independent implication.
178
Defendants further contended that even if "keep" and "bear" are not read as a unitary
term, "keep" cannot be broader than "bear" since the Second Amendment protects arms
used throughout the course of militia service exclusively. 179  The court noted that
Defendants referenced support for this contention, 18 which attempted to equate "keep"
to "'keep up' as in "'keep up a standing army' or as used in the Articles of
Confederation. 18 1 However, the court countered that "[s]uch outlandish views are likely
advanced because the plain meaning of 'keep' strikes a mortal blow to the collective
right theory," 182 as "keep" is a straightforward term "that implies ownership or
possession of a functioning weapon by an individual for private use.' '183 As a result, the
court concluded that "bear Arms," when viewed in context with "the people" and "keep,"
has a clear individual meaning. 184
2. The Prefatory Clause
Turning to the prefatory clause, the court noted that both sides generally agreed on
the meaning of this clause as declaring a civic purpose. 185 The primary dispute was over
the meaning of "a well regulated Militia" and whether the phrase declares the entire
prefatory clause's only purpose as civic. 186 Plaintiffs argued that "Militia" as used in "a
well regulated Militia" is "'practically synonymous' with "the people" as used in the
operative clause. 187 To counter, Defendants argued "Militia" referred to "a body of
adult men regulated and organized by state law as a civilian fighting force," but this is
non-existent today as "'the Framers' militia has faded into insignificance."'
' 188
Both sides drew from Miller and its interpretation of "Militia." 189 Defendants
declared that a historical account of the meaning of "Militia" and the definition used in
Miller supported their contention, 19 while "well regulated" implied a select body of
individuals. 19 1 The court began its analysis of this issue by looking to The Second
Militia Act. 19 2 The court reasoned that since the Act was a product of the Second
Congress, which consisted of many members of the First Congress who drafted the Bill
178. Id. (citing Appellees' Br. at 23 (July 21, 2006) (noting that "'[e]very word must have its due force, and
appropriate meaning; ... no word was unnecessarily used or needlessly added"' (quoting Holmes, 39 U.S. at
570-71)).
179. Id. at 385.
180. Id. (citing Wills, supra n. 32, at 66).
181. Parker II, 478 F.3d at 385.
182. Id. at 386 (quoting Dr. Johnson's dictionary definition of "keep" as meaning "'to retain; not to lose; to
have in custody; to preserve; and not to let go'). Johnson, supra n. 170, at 540.
183. Parker 11, 478 F.3d at 386 (citing Silveira 11, 328 F.3d at 573-74 (Kozinski, J., dissenting from denial of





188. Parker 11, 478 F.3d at 386.
189. Id.; see Miller, 307 U.S. at 178-79.
190. Parker 11, 478 F.3d at 386.
191. Id. at 389.
192. Id. at 387.
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of Rights, it would likely provide persuasive guidance to what the term "Militia" meant
as used in the Second Amendment. 193 The court read this in accord with Miller's
definition, the current congressional definition in 10 U.S.C. § 311, and Defendants' own
definition of "Militia" contained in the D.C. Code. 194
With this in mind, the court found that Defendants' interpretation of "Militia" is
too narrow since these sources confirm that the term refers to "all free .... able-bodied
men of a certain age who had given their names to the local militia officers as eligible for
militia service," such as today's National Guard as codified in 10 U.S.C. § 311.195
When reading "well regulated Militia," the court noted that today's National Guard is
unlike the "Militia" of 1791 when the Second Amendment was drafted1 96 since, unlike
today, participation was mandatory then.197 The court found that The Second Militia
Act further supported that militia members had a duty to arm themselves apart from of
actual service, while the state had a duty to organize the militia apart from whether
citizens actually armed themselves properly according to the statute. 198 Accordingly, the
court concluded the "well regulated Militia" clause was not referring to a select body of
individuals since militia participation in 1791 was required; the most efficient way to
preserve a militia was to protect an individual right to arms to ensure that citizens would
be ready for service in the militia when called. 199
3. Precedent
Because the court previously had acknowledged that neither the D.C. Circuit Court
of Appeals nor the Supreme Court had decided whether the Second Amendment
protected an individual or collective right, the court looked to persuasive precedent on
the issue.20 First, the court looked to Fraternal Order of Police20 1 where the court had
previously assumed the correctness of the collective right position urged by the
government because the appellants had not properly raised the issue. 202 Since this did
not provide guidance, the court turned to Supreme Court precedent, starting with Scott v.
Sandford2° 3 where the Supreme Court, in a discussion about Bill of Rights, noted:
[N]o one.., will contend that Congress can make any law in a Territory respecting the
establishment of religion, or the free exercise thereof, or abridging the freedom of speech
or of the press, or the right of the people of the Territory peaceably to assemble, and to
petition the Government for the redress of grievances... [n]or can Congress deny to the
people the right to keep and bear arms, nor the right to trial by jury, nor compel any one to
be a witness against himself in a criminal proceeding .... These powers. . . in relation to
193. Id.
194. Id. at 387-89 (citing D.C. Code § 49-401 (West 2001)).
195. Parker 11, 478 F.3d at 387-89.
196. U.S. Const. amend. 11.
197. Parker 11, 478 F.3d at 389.
198. Id.
199. Id
200. Id. at 391.
201. 173 F.3d 898.
202. Parker 1, 478 F.3d at 391.
203. 60 U.S. 393. 17
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rights of person ... are, in express and positive terms, denied to the General
Government.
2 04
Although the quoted language is dicta, the court was persuaded by the Supreme Court's
categorization of the Second Amendment among other well-known individual rights.
20 5
To bolster this contention, the court referenced Robertson v. Baldwin.20 6  The court
found this precedent to be the only mid-nineteenth to early-twentieth century cases to
address whether the Second Amendment protects an individual or collective right.
20 7
Since the District of Columbia is a federal district controlled by Congress, the court
noted that the Bill of Rights applies directly to it without need of incorporation through
the Fourteenth Amendment.
20 8
With these historical cases in mind, the court turned to Miller for the Supreme
Court's most comprehensive analysis of the Second Amendment to date. 20 9 The court
preliminarily indicated it read Miller as an individual rights interpretation of the Second
Amendment, though the Miller Court did not explicitly hold this.2 10 The court
acknowledged that both the collective and individual right theorists rely on Miller to
support their contention. 2 11  After setting out the facts, arguments, and quoting the
Miller test, the court recognized that Defendants argued this language refers to the
connection an individual must have to the militia before falling under the Second
Amendment's protections.2 12  However, in response, the court read this language as
focusing on the types of arms protected by the Second Amendment, and not as
conclusive evidence of whether the Second Amendment protects an individual or
collective right.2 13  The court reasoned that if Miller endorsed the collective rights
interpretation, the Miller Court surely would have pointed out that Jack Miller and Frank
204. Parker 11, 478 F.3d at 391 (quoting Scott, 60 U.S. at 450) (emphasis removed)).
205. Id.
206. The court quoted:
The law is perfectly well settled that the first 10 amendments to the constitution, commonly known
as the "Bill of Rights," were not intended to lay down any novel principles of government, but
simply to embody certain guaranties and immunities which we had inherited from our English
ancestors, and which had, from time immemorial, been subject to certain well-recognized
exceptions, arising from the necessities of the case.... Thus the freedom of speech and of the press
(article 1) does not permit the publication of libels, blasphemous or indecent articles, or other
publications injurious to public morals or private reputation; the right of the people to keep and bear
arms (article 2) is not infringed by laws prohibiting the carrying of concealed weapons; the
provision that no person shall be twice put in jeopardy (article 5) does not prevent a second trial, if
upon the first trial the jury failed to agree, or if the verdict was set aside upon the defendant's
motion; nor does the provision of the same article that no one shall be a witness against himself
impair his obligation to testify, if a prosecution against him be barred by the lapse of time, a pardon,
or by statutory enactment.
Id. at 392 (quoting Robertson, 165 U.S. at 281-82 (emphasis in Parker 11, not in Robertson)). The Parker II
court reasoned that if the Second Amendment was not an individual right, it is unlikely the Supreme Court
would have chosen a concealed weapon as an exception to the Second Amendment. Id.
207. Id. at 391 (citing Twining v. N.J., 211 U.S. 78, 98 (1908); Maxwell v. Dow, 176 U.S. 581, 597 (1900);
Presser v. Ill., 116 U.S. 252, 264-66 (1886); U.S. v. Cruikshank, 92 U.S. 542, 551 (1876)).
208. Parker I, 478 F.3d at 391-92 n. 13.




213. Parker 11, 478 F.3d at 393, 394.
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Layton were not affiliated with any militia body.2 14 In sum, the court summarized the
Miller test as two pronged: In order for a weapon to fall within the protections of the
Second Amendment, it must have "'a reasonable relationship 2 151 to the preservation or
efficiency of a well regulated militia"' and be "'of the kind in common useE2 16] at the
time."'
2 17
In dicta, the court emphasized that, in its opinion, the Ninth Circuit incorrectly
interpreted the term "Militia" as used in the Second Amendment in Silveira 1218 by
failing to take into account the Second Militia Act. 2 19 Conversely, the court found that
Miller's definition of "Militia" provided additional support of an individual rights
interpretation of the Second Amendment. 22  In the court's view, Miller recognized it
would seem foolish for the Second Amendment's drafters to draw a distinction between
the ownership and use of arms for private versus militia purposes, since the ban of arms
for private purposes would have crippled the militia's readiness if it became necessary to
call citizens for service.
22 1
To summarize the Parker II court's Second Amendment analysis:
[T]he Second Amendment protects an individual right to keep and bear arms. That right
existed prior to the formation of the new government under the Constitution and was
premised on the private use of arms for activities such as hunting and self-defense, the
latter being understood as resistance to either private lawlessness or the depredations of a
tyrannical government (or a threat from abroad). In addition, the right to keep and bear
arms had the important and salutary civic purpose of helping to preserve the citizen militia.
The civic purpose was also a political expedient for the Federalists in the First Congress as
it served, in part, to placate their Antifederalist opponents. The individual right facilitated
militia service by ensuring that citizens would not be barred from keeping the arms they
would need when called forth for militia duty. Despite the importance of the Second
Amendment's civic purpose, however, the activities it protects are not limited to militia
service, nor is an individual's enjoyment of the right contingent upon his or her continued
or intermittent enrollment in the militia.
222
4. Application
Applying this rule to the facts of Parker II, Defendants argued that modem
handguns are not the type of weapon that falls within the court's two-prong interpretation
of the Miller test, since automatic handguns were not in existence in the 1700s.223 The
court responded there could be no question that most handguns satisfied both prongs of
the test then and especially today, because pistols clearly bear "some reasonable
214. Id.
215. See Miller, 307 U.S. at 178 (citing Aymette, 21 Tenn. at 158).
216. Id. at 178-79.
217. Parker I1, 478 F.3d at 398 (drawing from the language of Miller, 307 U.S. at 178-79).
218. 312 F.3d at1069.
219. Parker 11, 478 F.3d at 394.
220. Id.
221. Id.
222. Id. at 395.
223. Id. at 397-98. 19
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relationship to the preservation or efficiency of a well regulated militia"224 and are 'of
the kind in common use ' ' '225 today.226 In addition, the court added that just as modem
communication is protected under the First and Fourth Amendments, the Second
Amendment was not limited to protecting only colonial pistols.
227
Clarifying its position, the court conceded this does not mean the government
cannot impose any regulations on the use of weapons. 228 Since the Second Amendment
has roots in the common law, the court looked to the restrictions recognized in that body
of authority. 22 9 These consisted of restricting one from exercising the right to carry arms
when under the influence of alcohol while on the premises of a church, polling facility,
or public assembly; 23  in a terrorist-like manner;
23 1 or if a convicted felon.2 3 2
Therefore, the mere concealment of a weapon does not offend the Second
Amendment. 233 The court reasoned these "reasonable restrictions" are a balance
between promoting the government's police interests of health, safety, and welfare of its
citizens, while not sacrificing the core principles that the Second Amendment is founded
on.234 The court continued that characteristics such as insanity or felonious conduct
would deprive one of the Second Amendment's protections, but someone who merely is
unsuited for militia service is not deprived of a "right to keep and bear Arms."
235
Recognizing Defendants' assertion that their gun laws were a public safety
measure, the court pointed out this ban on handguns was not limited to only citizens who
do not have a relationship to militia service. 236 Plaintiffs argued Defendants' gun laws
were unconstitutionally void since they irrationally restrict the lawful ownership of
handguns leaving the law-abiding citizen incapable of owning a handgun.2 37 The court
refused to go down this path and only took judicial notice of the black market of
handguns in D.C., since it found Defendants' gun laws in question are facially void
because they infringe on Plaintiffs' Second Amendment rights.
238
Regarding the specific provisions of the D.C. Code alleged to be in violation of the
Second Amendment by Plaintiffs, the court first analyzed D.C. Code § 7-2502.02.
239
224. See Miller, 307 U.S. at 178 (citing Aymette, 21 Tenn. at 158).
225. Id. at 178-79.
226. See Parker 11, 478 F.3d at 397.
227. Id. at 398.
228. Id. at 399.
229. Id.
230. Id.
231. Parker 11, 478 F.3d at 399 (citing N. C. v. Kerner, 107 S.E. 222, 225 (N.C. 1921)).
232. Id. (citing Lewis v. U.S., 445 U.S. 55, 65 n. 8 (1980)).
233. Id. (citing Robertson, 165 U.S. at 281-82).
234. Id.
235. Id.
236. Parker 11, 478 F.3d at 399 n. 17.
237. Id.
238. Id.
239. The Parker II court quoted the relevant portions of this statute:
(a) A registration certificate shall not be issued for a...
(4) Pistol not validly registered to the current registrant in the District prior to September 24, 1976,
except that the provisions of this section shall not apply to any organization that employs at least I
commissioned special police officer or other employee licensed to carry a firearm and that arms the
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Defendants argued that since this statute merely bans handguns, a citizen is left free to
choose any other type of weapon. 24  The court found this argument "frivolous" and
countered that once it is determined a weapon falls within the meaning of "Arms" as
used in the Second Amendment, the weapon is protected from governmental regulation
unless an exception applies.
24 1
Moving to D.C. Code § 22-4504,242 the court re-iterated that Plaintiffs do not
assert a right to carry handguns outside the home, only a right to carry handguns within
the home which is restricted by this provision of Defendants' gun laws.24 3 The court
declined to analyze the Second Amendment's protections with respect to carrying
handguns in public or cars, and only found that § 22-4504 unconstitutionally prevents
Plaintiffs from moving handguns throughout their home. 244  In support of this
contention, the court concluded such a restriction would undermine one of the rights the
Second Amendment is premised upon, self-defense. 245
Finally, D.C. Code § 7-2507.02 requires that a firearm be kept "'unloaded and
disassembled or bound by trigger lock or similar device, unless such firearm is kept at [a]
place of business, or while being used for lawful recreational purposes within the District
of Columbia.' 24 6 Plaintiffs argued they are entitled to a "'functional"' firearm within
the protection of the Second Amendment, while Defendants asserted that if faced with a
self-defense justification, a judge would likely give the statute a narrow meaning. 247
The court reasoned that this requirement waters down the existence of a firearm to a
"useless hunk of 'metal and springs"' and judicial discretion cannot be the escape hatch
to an unconstitutional statute.2 48 This would completely deprive a citizen of exercising
lawful self-defense rights.
249
In conclusion, Parker I was reversed, and since the court found there were no
material facts in dispute, the lower court was ordered to grant summary judgment for
employee with a firearm during the employee's duty hours or to a police officer who has retired
from the Metropolitan Police Department.
Id. at 399-400 n. 18 (quoting D.C. Code § 7-2502.02(a)(4)).
240. Id. at 400.
241. Parker 11, 478 F.3d at 400.
242. The Parker H court quoted the relevant portions of this statute:
(a) No person shall carry within the District of Columbia either openly or concealed on or about
their person, a pistol, without a license issued pursuant to District of Columbia law, or any deadly or
dangerous weapon capable of being so concealed. Whoever violates this section shall be punished
as provided in § 22-4515, except that:
(1) A person who violates this section by carrying a pistol, without a license issued pursuant to
District of Columbia law, or any deadly or dangerous weapon, in a place other than the person's
dwelling place, place of business, or on other land possessed by the person, shall be fined not more
than $5,000 or imprisoned for not more than 5 years, or both ....
Id. at 400 n. 20 (quoting D.C. Code § 22-4504).
243. Id. at 400.
244. Id.
245. Id.
246. Parker 11, 478 F.3d at 400-01 (quoting D.C. Code § 7-2507.02).
247. Id. at 401.
248. Id.
249. Id. 21
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Dick Heller consistent with Plaintiffs' relief requested. 250  Judge Henderson
dissented,25 1 and argued, among other things, the majority opinion added forty-five
useless pages of dicta to the Second Amendment debate when the case could have been
decided on the simple fact that D.C. is not a state within the meaning of the
amendment. 252  Judge Henderson continued, the Second Amendment "relates to the
Militia of the [s]tates only."
253
IV. DEFENSE OF THESIS
A. Text of the Second Amendment and Supreme Court Precedent
The Second Amendment's plain language secures an individual right. 254  The
government has "'powers' or "authorities," not rights; the "right" as used in the Bill of
Rights are for "the people, ' 255 and as Parker I pointed out, the Supreme Court has made
it clear that "the people" has the same meaning throughout the Bill of Rights. 256 A
similar interpretation of "people" can be found in Scott where Chief Justice Taney noted
that "'people' . . . and 'citizens' are synonymous terms, and mean the same thing."
2 57
Thus, one commentator observed that "[i]f individuals can 'bear arms,' then the right to
'bear arms' must belong to individuals."
2 58
As a result, the Second Amendment does not logically secure a "right" to be a
soldier;2 59 what it does for the "Militia" is protect that "the people" are armed during
inactive times, making organizations like today's National Guard not within the scope of
the Second Amendment's "well regulated Militia" clause.260 If the Second Amendment
protected the state's right to arm a militia, it would have repealed Article 1, § 8 (which
grants Congress the power of "organizing, arming, and disciplining the Militia. .. ."),
Article 1 § 10 ("No state shall, without the consent of Congress, . . . keep troops ... in a
time of peace. . . ."), and Article 2, § 2 (which declares the "President shall be
Commander in Chief. . . of the Militia of the several States .... ") of the Federal
Constitution; surely the Framers of the Second Amendment did not intend such a
250. Id.
251. Parker 11, 478 F.3d at 401. (Henderson, J., dissenting).
252. Id. at 401-02 (Henderson, J., dissenting).
253. Id. at 409. A forthcoming law review article by professor Eugene Volokh dissects Judge Henderson's
dissent. Kopel, supra n. 45, at 30 (citing Eugene Volokh, Necessary to the Security of a Free State, __ Notre
Dame L. Rev. _ (forthcoming) (available at http://www.law.ucla.edu/volokh/freestate.pdo).
254. Br. of Am. Civ. Rights Union in Support of Appeallants at 2, Parker 11, 478 F.3d at 381 (noting that the
Second Amendment is "stated in plain English, is consistently supported by volumes of historical authorities,
and no other alternative interpretation of the Amendment is logically coherent"); Schmidt, supra n. 16, at 988
(citing William J. Michael, Questioning the Necessity of Concealed Carry Laws, 38 Akron L. Rev. 53, 57
(2005)).
255. Schmidt, supra n. 16, at 984 (internal citations omitted).
256. See Parker II, 478 F.3d at 381; Br. of Amicus Curiae Sts. in Support of Appellants at 4-5, Parker 11,
478 F.3d 370.
257. 60 U.S. at 404 (emphasis added).
258. Kopel, supra n. 4, at 119.
259. Br. of Amicus Curiae Sts. in Support of Appellants at 4, Parker 11, 478 F.3d 370.
260. Id. at 9.
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result. 26 1 In addition, a right to keep and bear arms while performing militia service
would seem meaningless, since it is likely those serving in the militia would be provided
with the necessary equipment, including weapons, to carry out their duties.
262
Looking to persuasive Supreme Court precedent not accounted for in Parker II, in
Miller, Justice McReynolds noted "[i]n the margin some of the more important opinions
and comments by writers are cited. ' 2 63 Of the authority cited after this statement,2 64 two
cases are Supreme Court opinions and six are state court opinions which interpret the
Second Amendment or its parallel state constitutional provision as an individual right,
while treatises by Justice Joseph Story and Thomas Cooley also support the individual
rights position.26 5  In addition, the case cited after the Miller test266 supports the
"standard" individual rights model 267 as it holds the only weapons protected under
Tennessee's Constitution are those "'part of the ordinary military equipment, ' ' 2 68 while
also mentioning in dicta the Second Amendment to the Federal Constitution has the same
construction and meaning.
269
Looking to post-Miller precedent, Konigsberg v. State Bar of California270
included dicta about the Second Amendment's scope. Though Konigsberg upheld the
denial of an application for a license to practice law because the applicant refused to
answer questions about communism, thus failing to show he possessed good moral
character, 27 1 Justice Harlan argued the First and Second Amendments protected
individual rights, but these protections are not absolute:
2 72
[A]s Mr. Justice Holmes once said: "[The] provisions of the Constitution are not
mathematical formulas having their essence in their form; they are organic living
institutions transplanted from English soil. Their significance is vital not formal; it is to be
gathered not simply by taking the words and a dictionary, but by considering their origin
and the line of their growth.".. . In this connection also compare the equally unqualified
command of the Second Amendment: "the right of the people to keep and bear arms shall
not be infringed." And see [Miller].
273
Regarding the history of the American Bill of Rights, one commentator has further
observed that even today, a Briton without a criminal record can easily obtain even a
shotgun for his leisure, 274 while another identified the common law of England as far
261. See Robert A. Levy, Thanks to the Second Amendment, Leg. Times (Apr. 16, 2007) (available at
http://dcguncase.com/blog/links/).
262. Br. of Amicus Curiae Am. Civ. Rights Union in Support of Appeallants at 16, Parker I1, 478 F.3d 370.
263. 307 U.S. at 182.
264. Id. at 182 n. 3 (internal citations omitted).
265. Kopel, supra n. 4, at 107.
266. See Miller, 307 U.S. at 178 (citing Aymette, 21 Tenn. at 158).
267. Kopel, supra n. 4, at 106-07.
268. Glenn Harlan Reynolds, A Critical Guide to the Second Amendment, 62 Tenn. L. Rev. 461, 500 (1995)
(quoting Aymette, 21 Tenn. at 156).
269. Kopel, supra n. 4, at 108.
270. 366 U.S. 36 (1961).
271. Id. at 37-38.
272. Kopel, supra n. 4, at 147.
273. Konigsberg, 366 U.S. at 51 n. 10 (internal citations omitted) (emphasis added).
274. David B. Kopel, It Isn't about Duck Hunting: The British Origins of the Right to Arms, 93 Mich. L.
Rev. 1333, 1335 (1995). 23
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back as 1400 to support the root of the Second Amendment, codified in the English Bill
of Rights of 1689.275 As well, every known judicial opinion and scholarly commentary
from the nineteenth century, except one, 276 treats the Second Amendment as an
individual right.
277
The next notable Supreme Court precedent came in Moore v. City of East
Cleveland.278  Although Moore held citizens have a fundamental right to keep their
nuclear and extended family together, 279 in a discussion about the Fourteenth
Amendment's scope, Justice Powell noted:
"[The] full scope of the liberty guaranteed by the Due Process Clause cannot be found in or
limited by the precise terms of the specific guarantees elsewhere provided in the
Constitution. This 'liberty' is not a series of isolated points pricked out in terms of the
taking of property; the freedom of speech, press, and religion; the right to keep and bear
arms; the freedom from unreasonable searches and seizures; and so on."
2 80
Another case from the Warren Court hinting at the Second Amendment's scope
came in Duncan v. Louisiana.28 1 Although Duncan involved the Sixth Amendment's
trial by jury incorporated to the state through the Fourteenth Amendment, 282 in a
discussion about the Bill of Rights as a whole, Justice Black provided:
[T]he personal rights guarantied [sic] and secured by the first eight amendments of the
Constitution; such as the freedom of speech and of the press; the right of the people
peaceably to assemble and petition the Government for a redress of grievances, a right
appertaining to each and all the people; the right to keep and to bear arms .... 283
One commentator noted that a similar inference to Justice Black's views on the Second
Amendment can be drawn from his statement, "I prefer to think our Bill of Rights as
including all provisions of the original Constitution and Amendments that protect
individual liberty by barring government from acting in a particular area or from acting
except under certain prescribed procedures. "
284
The most recent and significant discussion by the Supreme Court came in Justice
Thomas's concurring opinion in Printz v. U.S.2 85 where the Court held the Brady Act
unconstitutional. 286  Arguing that even if the Brady Act was within Congress's
275. Schmidt, supra n. 16, at 993-94 (citing Or. v. Kessler, 614 P.2d 94, 98 (Or. 1980)).
276. Kopel, supra n. 4, at 137 (citing Buzzard v. Ark., 20 Ark. 106 (1842)).
277. Id. (citing David B. Kopel, The SeeondAmendment in the Nineteenth Century, 1998 BYU L. Rev. 1359
(1998)); see also Br. of Amicus Curiae Sts. in Support of Appellants at 25, Parker 11, 478 F.3d 370 (noting
"'[t]he historical necessities and events of the English constitutional experience.., were familiar to' the
Framers and should 'inform our understanding of the purpose and meaning of constitutional provisions'
(quoting Loving v. U.S., 517 U.S. 748, 766 (1996)).
278. 431 U.S. 494 (1977).
279. Id. at 498-500 (plurality).
280. Id. at 502 (quoting Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497, 543 (1961) (Harlan, J., dissenting) (emphasis added)).
This same passage was also quoted in Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 848 (1992) (plurality).
281. 391 U.S. 145 (1968).
282. Id. at 149.
283. Id. at 166-67 (Black & Douglas, JJ., concurring).
284. Hugo L. Black, The Bill of Rights, 35 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 865 (1960) (emphasis added); Kopel, supra n. 4,
at 148.
285. 521 U.S. at 936 (1997) (Thomas, J., concurring).
286. Kopel, supra n. 4, at 121.
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Commerce Clause Power, it might still be an unconstitutional violation of the Second
Amendment, Justice Thomas provided:
287
The Constitution ... places whole areas outside the reach of Congress' regulatory
authority.... The Second Amendment ... appears to contain an express limitation on the
Government's authority.... This Court has not had recent occasion to consider the nature
of the substantive right safeguarded by the Second Amendment. If, however, the Second
Amendment is read to confer a personal ight to "keep and bear arms," a colorable
argument exists that the Federal Government's regulatory scheme, at least as it pertains to
the purely intrastate sale or possession of firearms, runs afoul of that Amendment's
protections.... Perhaps, at some future date, this Court will have the opportunity to
determine whether Justice Story was correct when he wrote that the ri ht to bear arms "has
justly been considered, as the palladium of the liberties of a republic. ' ' 88
Expanding on Justice Story's philosophy, one commentator found him a consistent
supporter of the federal government's power, 289 since he only once dissented from a
constitutional decision when Chief Justice Marshall was in the majority.29°  Beyond
Justice Thomas' reference, Justice Story, while discussing the Second Amendment,
argued out of Court "'[i]t is against sound policy... [to] trample upon the rights of the
people" and further warned that denying people the Second Amendment's protections as
a strong check on federal power would "gradually undermine all the protections intended
by... our national bill of rights."'
29 1
Though not expressed in Court, it is worth noting the views from other current
Supreme Court Justices regarding the Second Amendment's scope. Justice Scalia hinted
in his book that he supports an individual rights interpretation. 292  At his Senate
Confirmation Hearings when asked about the Second Amendment, Chief Justice Roberts
acknowledged it was an "'open issue"' but declined to express an opinion due to the
current split of courts and possibility the Court would resolve the issue during his
287. Id. at 122.
288. Printz, 521 U.S. at 937-38 (Thomas, J., concurring) (internal citations omitted) (first emphasis added,
second emphasis in original).
289. Kopel, supra n. 4, at 183 (citing James McClellan, Joseph Story and the American Constitution 311 n.
161 (2d. ed., U. Oklahoma Press 1990)).
290. Id. at 183 n. 351.
291. Id. at 184 (quoting Joseph Story, A Familiar Exposition of the Constitution of the United States 264-65
(1842)); see also Br. of Amicus Curiae Am. Civ. Rights Union in Support of Appeallants at 21, Parker 11, 478
F.3d 370 (quoting Justice Story who provided that "'one of the ordinary modes, by which tyrants accomplish
their purposes without resistance, is, by disarming the people, and making it an offence [sic] to keep
arms....').
292. Justice Scalia provided:
So also, we value the right to bear arms less than did the Founders (who thought the right to self-
defense to be absolutely fundamental), and there will be few tears shed if and when the Second
Amendment is held to guarantee nothing more than the state National Guard. But this just shows
the Founders were right when they feared that some (in their view misguided) future generation
might wish to abandon liberties that they considered essential, and so sought to protect those
liberties in a Bill of Rights. We may ... like elimination of the right to bear arms; but let us not
pretend that these are not reductions of rights.
Kopel, supra n. 4, at 118 n. 48 (quoting Antonin Scalia, A Matter of Interpretation: Federal Courts and the
Law 43 (Amy Gutmann ed., Princeton U. Press 1998)); see Br. of Amicus Curiae NRA Civ. Rights Def. Fund
in Support of Appellants at 3, Parker II, 478 F.3d 370. 25
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tenure.2 93 Justice Alito, during his term on the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third
Circuit, dissented in U.S. v. Rybar294 and argued a law criminalizing machine gun
possession was unconstitutional, though he cited the Commerce Clause rather than the
Second Amendment for support.
29 5
Even though the Supreme Court has virtually said nothing about the Second
Amendment 2 96 outside of mere dicta, it seems these cases invite similar inferences to
those drawn from Scott and Robertson by the Parker II court.297 In light of all Second
Amendment Supreme Court precedent, there seems to be an established line of authority
supporting an individual rights interpretation of the Second Amendment, 298 while the
"great weight" of scholarly commentary also adopts this position. 299
B. Public Policy and Application of the Second Amendment
Although the Parker H court eluded at least one policy argument advanced by
Plaintiffs,3° ° public policy is in favor of the court's holding. The right to defend your
life, property, and family is "one of the most basic rules of nature." 3° 1 Currently in ten
of twelve federal judicial circuits, if someone intrudes into a private home, the only
remedy is to call 911 and hope the police arrive in a timely manner. 30 2 As well, in D.C.,
courts have held that the city's police department is "not generally liable to victims of
criminal acts for failure to provide adequate police protection."303 Nationwide, in 69.2%
of violent crimes it takes more than five minutes for police to respond, and in 40.3% it
takes more than eleven minutes.
30 4
Firearms are the most reliable, durable, and efficient means for effective self-
defense available, especially for vulnerable groups such as women and the elderly.305 In
addition, firearms are annually used 3-6 times more to deter criminals than by criminals
using them to carry out crimes, 306 and in more than eight out of ten cases where an
assault victim brandishes a firearm in defense against an assailant, the criminal flees,
even when armed.
30 7
293. Erin Sheley, Gunfight at D.C. Corral, 12 Wkly. Stand. II (Mar. 26, 2007).
294. 103 F.3d 273, 286 (3d Cir. 1996) (Alito, J., dissenting).
295. Sheley, supra n. 293.
296. Volokh, supra n. 16 (internal citations omitted).
297. See supra nn. 204, 206.
298. Kopel, supra n. 4, at 186-87.
299. Br. of Amicus Curiae Sts. in Support of Appeallants at 5, Parker I, 478 F.3d 370.
300. See 478 F.3d at 399 n. 17.
301. Br. of Amicus Curiae Cong. of Racial Equal. in Support of Appellants at 25, Parker 11, 478 F.3d 370.
302. Leonard W. Levy, Origins of the Bill of Rights 13-14 (Yale U. Press 1999).
303. Natl. Rifle Assn. of Am. Inst. for Legis. Action, The Case for Reforming the District of Columbia's Gun
Laws, http://www.nraila.org/Lssues/FactSheets/Read.aspx?ID=72 (Mar. 28, 2007) (quoting Warren v. Dist. of
Columbia, 444 A.2d 1,4 (D.C. App. 1981)).
304. Br. of Amicus Curiae Cong. of Racial Equal. in Support of Appellants at 24, Parker 11, 478 F.3d 370
(citing Bureau of J. Statistics, Percent Distribution of Incidents Where Police Came to the Victim,
http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/bjs/pub/pdf/cvus/current/cv05I07.pdf (accessed Mar. 18, 2008)).
305. Brandeis Br. Filed on Behalf of Amici Profs. at 1-2, Parker 11, 478 F.3d 370 (quoting Linda Gorman &
David B. Kopel, Self-defense: The Equalizer, 15 Forum Applied Research & Pub. Policy 92 (2000)).
306. Id. at 2.
307. Robert A. Levy, Am. Spectator, They Never Learn, http://www.spectator.org/dsparticle.asp?art
id=1 1342 (Apr. 25, 2007).
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An examination of firearms' criminology reveals from 1946 in the U.S., when the
earliest reliable firearm data compilation began, to 2000, the murder rate rose only one
tenth of a percent while the rate of civilian firearm ownership quintupled.
30 8
Specifically in the 1990s, while U.S. gun ownership increased by almost fifty million
guns, murder rates decreased by a third. 309 Comparing these numbers to other countries,
such as Russia, France, Poland, Norway, Austria, Germany, Greece, England, Canada,
and Switzerland, nations with more firearms per capita do not have higher murder rates
than those nations with fewer.
3 10
The destructive role of firearms in our society is determined by socio-cultural and
economic factors, not their availability. 3 11  While 15% of Americans have criminal
records,312 approximately 90% of adult murderers have records consisting of an average
of four felonies from six years of recorded criminal behavior. 3 13  Additionally, one
commentator found that the abuse rate for firearms has been calculated at 0.0000625%
for murder and 0.0009188% for aggravated assault, 3 14 thus demonstrating:
[T]he majority of gun owners are responsible, law-abiding citizens who use guns mainly
for sports and in self-defense.
The only people who have ever obeyed gun control laws are law-abiding, gun-owning
citizens. The criminals have not and will not magically begin to obey strict gun laws. It is
time that the United States government and the states enforce the criminal laws they
currently have and stop their efforts to control a symptom of the problem and not the
disease. The perceived gun problem is peripheral to the problem of crime. As criminals
generally do not like to target armed individuals for their prey, widespread ownership of
guns, coupled with responsible use and training, would most likely reduce crime.
3 15
308. Brandeis Br. Filed on Behalf of Amici Profs. at 3, Parker 11, 478 F.3d 370 (citing Gary Kleck,
Targeting Guns: Firearms and Their Control 96 (Aldine Transaction 1997)).
309. Id. at 4 (citing Daniel D. Polsby & Don B. Kates, Jr., American Homicide Exceptionalism, 69 U. Colo.
L. Rev. 969, 984-88 (1998)). An expanded examination of Switzerland, for example, reveals their right to bear
arms is as precious as our right to vote because it represents a cultural heritage that symbolizes a wholesome,
community activity, and is a part of proud tradition that assembles the critical makeup of a national defense
system. Stephen P. Halbrook, Target Switzerland 241 (Sarpedon 1998); David Kopel, International
Perspectives on Gun Control, 15 N.Y. L. Sch. J. Intl. & Comp. L. 247, 247-48 (1995). This approach seems to
produce fruitful societal benefits beyond a very low crime rate such as enjoying the weakest centralized
government of any world democracy, belonging to no traditional alliances, and no involvement in both world
wars. David B. Kopel, The Samurai, the Mountie, and the Cowboy: Should America Adopt the Gun Controls of
Other Democracies? 290, 407 tbl. I (Prometheus Bks. 1992); Stephen P. Halbrook, Citizens in Arms: The
Swiss Experience, 8 Tex. Rev. L. & Pol. 141, 152 (2003).
310. Brandeis Br. Filed on Behalf of Amici Profs. at 12, Parker I1, 478 F.3d 370 (citing Graduate Inst. of
Intl. Stud., Small Arms Survey 2003 (Oxford U. Press 2003); Joyce Lee Malcolm, Guns and Violence: The
English Experience (Harvard U. Press 2002)).
311. Id. at 28.
312. Id. at 14 (citing Mark Cooney, The Decline of Elite Homicide, 35 Criminology 381, 386 (1997)).
313. Id. at 15 (citing Gary Kleck & Don B. Kates, Armed: New Perspectives on Gun Control 20-21
(Prometheus Bks. 2001)).
314. Ronald H. Benson, Student Author, Printz Punts on the Palladium of Rights: It Is Time to Protect the
Right of the Individual to Keep and Bear Arms, 50 Ala. L. Rev. 561, 583 (1999) (citing Nicholas Johnson,
Beyond the Second Amendment: An Individual Right to Arms Viewed through the Ninth Amendment, 24
Rutgers L.J. 1, 78-79 (1992) and noting these calculations were done by dividing the number of incidents
involving firearms by the number of total firearms in the United States).
315. Id.; accord Williams, supra n. 10 (quoting Washington resident Tom Palmer who is a previous assault
victim seeking a firearm for self-defense); see also Br. of Amicus Curiae Sts. in Support of Appellants at 30- 27
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In sum, while the media ultimately affects our views towards firearms, data strongly
suggests that allowing firearms to be in the hands of responsible adults actually reduces
crime, while having no impact on accidental deaths.
3 16
Further support is found in two studies on gun control legislation conducted in the
last five years by neutral, non-partisan, respected federal agencies that could not find a
single gun control measure that reduced violent crime, suicide, or gun accidents. 3 17 The
first of these studies was conducted by the National Academy of Sciences in 2004, which
reviewed 253 journal articles, ninety-nine books, forty-three government publications,
and empirical research of its own.3 18  The second was compiled by the Centers for
Disease Control in 2003, which considered firearm and ammunition bans, along with
waiting period, acquisition, registration, and licensing restrictions for the purchase of
firearms, as well as child-access and zero-tolerance laws.
3 19
Three additional objective studies confirm the effect of gun laws. 32  The first
examined all 3,054 counties in the U.S. and found, after accounting for other factors, that
concealed handgun laws reduce murder by 8.5%, rape by 5%, and assault by 7%. 321 The
second study, analyzing the same geographic region from 1977-2000, found that murder
rates decreased 1.5-2.3% for every year concealed handgun laws are in effect, saving
society billions of dollars in costs annually.322 Lastly, a 1998 Library of Congress study
found "'it is difficult to find a correlation between the existence of strict firearms
regulations and a lower incidence of gun-related crimes. ' '323 In light of this empirical
evidence, the argument that strict gun control laws produce societal benefits such as
reduced crime and deaths seems obscure. 324  The more accurate observation appears
that, "[t]he evidence is clear: more guns in the hands of responsible owners yield lower
rates of violent crimes. Gun control does not work. It just prevents weaker people from
defending themselves against stronger predators."
32 5
31, Parker 11, 478 F.3d 370 (citing Florenz Plassman & John Whitley, Confirming "'More Guns, Less Crime",
55 Stan. L. Rev 1313, 1315 (2003)).
316. Brandeis Br. Filed on Behalf of Amici Profs. at 23, Parker I1, 478 F.3d 370 (citing David B. Mustard,
Culture Effects Our Beliefs about Firearms, but Data Are Important, 151 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1387, 1391 (2003)).
317. Id. at 28-29 (citing Comm. on Law & Just. & Natl. Research Council, Firearms and Violence: A
Critical Review (Charles F. Wellford et al., eds., Nail. Academies Press 2004); Robert A. Hahn et al., First
Reports Evaluating the Effectiveness of Strategies for Preventing Violence: Firearm Laws,
http://www.cdc.gov/mmwR/preview/mmwrhtml/rr5214a2.htm (Oct. 3, 2003)).
318. Id. at 14 (citing Comm. on Law & Just. & Natl. Research Council, supra n. 317); see Robert A. Levy,
Loaded for the High Court, 30 Legal Times (Sept. 24, 2007) (available at http://dcguncase.com/blog/wp-
content/uploads/2007/09/levylegal-times_9-24-071 .pdf).
319. Levy, supra n. 318; Hahn et al., supra n. 317.
320. Br. of Amicus Curiae Sts. in Support of Appellants at 31, Parker 1!, 478 F.3d 370.
321. Id. (citing John R. Lott, Jr., More Guns, Less Crime: Understanding Crime and Gun-Control Laws fig.
II (U. Chicago Press 1998)).
322. Id. (citing William Alan Bartley & Mark A. Cohen, The Effect of Concealed Weapons Laws: An
Extreme Bound Analysis, 36 Econ. Inquiry 258, 258-65 (1998); Stephen G. Bronars & John R. Lott, Jr.,
Criminal Deterrence, Geographic Spillovers, and the Right to Carry Concealed Hanguns, Am. Econ. Rev.
475-79 (May 1998)). As of 2005, there were thirty-seven states with concealed handgun legislation. See
Michael, supra n. 254, at 53.
323. Br. of Amicus Curiae Cong. of Racial Equal. in Support of Appellants at 24, Parker II, 478 F.3d 370
(quoting Lib. of Cong., Report for Congress: Firearms Regulations in Various Foreign Countries I (May
1998)).
324. But see Morison Buck, Letters: Guns Galore, 34 Fla. Bar News 6 (Aug. 15, 2007).
325. Levy, supra n. 307. Levy further argued that "[ainti-gun advocates, however noble their motives, help
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Looking specifically at the District of Columbia, in the five years prior to 1976,
when the statutes challenged by Plaintiffs were enacted, the murder rate dropped from
thirty-seven to twenty-seven per 100,000 people, but during the five years after the
statutes were enacted, these numbers rose back to thirty-five per 100,000.326
Consistently since 1976, D.C.'s murder rate has the highest in the U.S., except for a few
instances where it ranked second or third. 327 With that being said, during a twenty-five
year life of the D.C. Gun Laws, from enactment in 1976 to 1991, the D.C. homicide rate
rose 200% while the national homicide rate in that same period rose only 12%.328
Specifically, from 1999-2004, the D.C. violent crime rate was higher than every other
state in the U.S., and even double that of some states.
329
From the above data, it seems public policy favors granting the right to self-
defense protected by the Second Amendment by possessing appropriate firearms, but
even if the data were the opposite, the issue is about the meaning of the Second
Amendment. 330 As one commentator has observed, "the Constitution has spoken and
that is enough" therefore "[s]uch ... concerns may be relevant to, say, the question of
whether to repeal the [Second Amendment], but ... should certainly have no role in [its
interpretation]. 33 1  Faithfulness to the federal Constitution requires that the Second
Amendment's enumerated right be granted the same vigorous protection as any other
constitutional right,332 rather than merely misreading Miller without conducting an
exhaustive study,333 or treating the Second Amendment as a "politically incorrect,
disfavored stepchild of the Bill of Rights."
33 4
If public policy should be the deciding factor when interpreting constitutional
provisions, does that mean we do away with juries too, since sometimes citizens fail to
effectively meet their jury duties? 335 Of course not, and as a response to the collective
rights interpretation of the Second Amendment, one commentator argued that this is
likely the result of academics not taking their views public and instead only talking to
each other.336 Harvard Law School Professor Alan Dershowitz admits to hating guns
and wishing the Second Amendment was repealed, but condemns
create the environment in which horrors like Virginia Tech occur." Id.
326. Brandeis Br. Filed on Behalf of Amici Profs. at 19, Parker 11, 478 F.3d 370.
327. Id.
328. Br. of Amicus Curiae Cong. of Racial Equal. in Support of Appellants at 23, Parker 11, 478 F.3d 370
(citing Repeal D.C. Gun Ban, Wash. Times A12 (May. 21, 2005)).
329. Br. of Amicus Curiae Sts. in Support of Appellants at 30, Parker 11, 478 F.3d 370 (citing FBI and U.S.
DOJ Unif. Crime Rpts., Crime in the U.S. (internal citations omitted)).
330. Levy, supran. 318.
331. Glenn Harlan Reynolds, A Critical Guide to the Second Amendment, 62 Tenn. L. Rev. 461, 484 (1995)
(emphasis in original).
332. Br. of Amicus Curiae Am. Civ. Rights Union in Support of Appeallants at 2, Parker 11, 478 F.3d 370;
see Silveira H, 328 F.3d at 569.
333. Br. of Amicus Curiae Am. Civ. Rights Union in Support of Appeallants at 3, Parker 11, 478 F.3d 370
(noting that "[a]mong the inferior Federal courts, no precedent has reviewed the overwhelming body of
authorities... and rebutted [them] to conclude that the Second Amendment does not provide for an individual
right to bear arms. They generally just misread [Miller] ... contrary to what the Supreme Court has itself has
said about Miller, and increasingly just cite each other") (referring to Printz, 521 U.S. at 938 n. 1)).
334. Id. at 2.
335. Reynolds, supra n. 331, at 486-87.
336. Id. at 508. 29
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[f]oolish liberals who are trying to read the Second Amendment out of the Constitution by
claiming it's not an individual right or that it's too much of a public safety hazard [because
they do not] see the danger in the big picture. They're courting disaster by encouraging
others to use the same means to eliminate portions of the Constitution they don't like.
337
Unfortunately, however, as long as Americans remain uninformed on the issue, they will
continue to be manipulated by the current majority of courts' collective rights
interpretation of the Second Amendment, which, as one commentator observed, is
similar to the empty promises offered by the diet and fitness industries.
338
V. CURRENT STATE OF PARKER 1I AND ITS POSSIBLE FUTURE EFFECTS
On May 8, 2007, a request by Defendants to rehear Parker II en banc was denied
by a vote of 6-4.339  Subsequently, Defendants filed a petition for certiorari to the
Supreme Court on September 4, 2007, and framed the issue as "[w]hether the Second
Amendment forbids the District of Columbia from banning private possession of
handguns while allowing possession of rifles and shotguns. ' 34 °  On the other hand,
Plaintiffs urged a broader issue in "[w]hether the Second Amendment guarantees law-
abiding, adult individuals a right to keep ordinary, functional firearms, including
handguns, in their homes." 34 1  On November 20, 2007, the Supreme Court granted
certiorari to Parker I and framed the issue as "[w]hether the following provisions-D.C.
Code secs. 7-2502.02(a)(4), 22-4504(a), and 7-2507.02-violate the Second Amendment
rights of individuals who are not affiliated with any state-regulated militia, but who wish
to keep handguns and other firearms for private use in their homes."
342
Oral argument for Parker II is scheduled for March 18, 2008, 343 and one
commentator expects an opinion in June 2008. 344 Parker II has been termed as a "wild-
card" by one commentator, 34 5 and whatever the Supreme Court holds, there is sure to be
serious presidential election campaign effects with the 2008 election year
approaching. 34 6 Parker H presents a professional and scholarly setting for the Supreme
337. Dan Gifford, The Conceptual Foundations of Anglo-American Jurisprudence in Religion and Reason,
62 Tenn. L. Rev. 759, 789 (1995); see Levy, supra n. 15.
338. Reynolds, supra n. 331, at 508.
339. Or. Denial of En Banc Rehearing, Parker H, 478 F.3d 370.
340. Pet. for a Writ of Cert., Parker 11, 478 F.3d 370.
341. Br. in Response to Pet. for Cert., Parker 11, 478 F.3d 370.
342. Heller, 128 S. Ct. 645.
343. S. Ct. of the U.S., Argument Calendars, http://www.supremecourtus.gov/oral-arguments/argument-
calendars/MonthlyArgumentCalMarch2008.pdf (last updated Mar. 3, 2008).
344. Alan Gura, Supreme Court Agrees to Hear Second Amendment Challenge to D.C. Gun Ban,
http://dcguncase.com/blog/2007/11/20/supreme-court-agrees-to-hear-second-amendment-challenge-to-dc-gun-
ban/ (Nov. 20, 2007).
345. Reynolds, supra n. 45, at 347.
346. Robert Barnes & David Nakamura, D.C. Case Could Shape Gun Laws, Wash. Post A01 (Sept. 5, 2007);
Tom Goldstein, SCOTUSblog, A True Rightward Turn? The Upcoming Term and the 2008 Elections,
http://www.scotusblog.com/wp/uncategorized/a-true-rightward-turn-the-upcoming-term-and-the-2008-
elections/#more-5897 (Sept. 18, 2007); Robert A. Levy, Mukasey Should Declare Where He Stands on the
Second Amendment, http://dcguncase.com/blog/wp-content/uploads/2007/10/th-levyl.pdf (Oct. 2, 2007)
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Court to rule on the Second Amendment, 34 7 and Judge Silberman has framed the issue
so that 'no honest [C]ourt can avoid dealing with it head-on."' 34 8 In addition, "win or
lose, the Supreme Court case on [Parker I1] will not be the final battle" for Second
Amendment issues.
349
If Parker H is affirmed, which will likely turn on Justice Kennedy, 350 depending
on how the Supreme Court decides the issue, the Court's holding could invalidate gun
laws across the country and have an extraordinary effect on future gun control
legislation, or have virtually no immediate effect on state gun control legislation without
incorporation through the Fourteenth Amendment. 35 1  If Parker I1 is reversed, little
disruption would seem expected at least in the federal courts, since as noted above,
currently only the D.C. Circuit and Fifth Circuit have held the Second Amendment
protects an individual right to bear arms. However, there could potentially be "far-
reaching" effects on the Court's holding,352 and the Second Amendment would be
"eviscerat[ed] ... for all practical purposes." 3 53 As well, "'whenever... the right of the
people to keep and bear arms is, under any color or pretext whatsoever, prohibited,
liberty, if not already annihilated, is on the brink of destruction."'3 54  "Without our
Second Amendment rights, all other rights [secured by the Constitution are merely] 'on
loan' from the government" 355 and we face potential future disaster.3 56  Hence,
347. Gura & Possessky, supra n. 26.
348. Tony Mauro, D.C. Circuit Strikes Down Gun-Control Law, Priming Issue for High Court, Leg. Times
(Mar. 12, 2007) (available at http://www.law.com/jsp/law/LawArticleFriendly.jsp?id=l173434606378)
(quoting Roger Pilon of the Cato Institute).
349. Kopel, supra n. 45, at 60 (noting that, for example, if Parker 11 is affirmed, the next likely case will be
one raising the question of whether the Second Amendment will be binding on the states through incorporation
through the Fourteenth Amendment since Parker 11 involved the jurisdiction of D.C. rather than a state. In
addition, Kopel notes "even if the Supreme Court affirms [Parker 11], the most important bulwark of the right
to arms and the right of self-defense will not be the courts, but will still be the legislative process, and the
influence on that process of the world's oldest and largest civil rights organization-the National Rifle
Association."); see also Lyle Denniston, SCOTUSblog, Circuit Denies New Review of Second Amendment,
http://www.scotusblog.com/wp/uncategorized/circuit-denies-new-review-of-second-amendment/ (May 8,
2007).
350. Reynolds, supra n. 45, at 335 (noting that Justice Kennedy found himself in the majority in every single
5-4 decision during the Court's October 2006 term) (citing Linda Greenhouse, In Steps Big and Small,
Supreme Court Moved Right, N.Y. Times Al (July 1, 2007) (available at http://www.nytimes.com/
2007/07/01/washington/01 scotus.html)).
351. Anthony Gallia, "Your Weapons, You Will Not Need Them." Comment on the Supreme Court's Sixty-
Year Silence on the Right to Keep and Bear Arms, 33 Akron L. Rev. 131, 140 (1999) (citing Stephen P.
Halbrook, Freedmen, the Fourteenth Amendment, and the Right to Bear Arms, 1866-1876 192 (Praeger
Publishers 1998)); Kopel, supra n. 45, at 60; James Oliphant, D.C. Gun Case May Hit Chicago: City's Law is
Next Target If Foe Wins in Supreme Court, Chi. Tribune sec. News, 3 (Sept. 5, 2007); David Stras, Academic
Round-up, http://www.scotusblog.com/wp/uncategorized/academic-round-up-21/ (Dec. 31, 2007) (quoting
Nelson Lund that the Court is "'more likely than not' to affirm Parker 11).
352. Reynolds, supra n. 45, at 349-50 (noting that if Parker H is reversed many Americans will likely be
inflamed at the Court's demonstrated willingness to protect non-enumerated rights such as abortion-
referencing Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973)-and homosexuality-referencing Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S.
558 (2003)-while not protecting the Second Amendment's enumerated "right to bear Arms").
353. Br. of Amicus Curiae Sts. in Support of Appellants at 4, Parker 11, 478 F.3d 370.
354. Id. at 23 (quoting Blackstone's Commentaries 300 (S. Tucker, ed., Philadelphia 1803) (emphasis
added)).
355. Mike Huckabee, Issues: Second Amendment Rights, http://www.mikehuckabee.com/index.cfmFuse
Action=lssues.View&Issue-id = 18 (accessed Mar. 18, 2008).
356. Levy, supra n. 15 (quoting Silveira 11, 328 F.3d at 569 (Kozinski, J., dissenting from denial of rehearing
en banc)); see also Story, supra n. 291. 31
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regardless of how unfavorable one looks upon the Second Amendment, Judge Kozinski
reminds us that denying the protections it asserts "is a mistake a free people get to make
only once," no matter how improbable such a "doomsday" may seem today.
357
VI. CONCLUSION
The Supreme Court should affirm Parker H1 for the reasons advanced by Judge
Silberman and above. 358  A steady stream of Supreme Court precedent and notable
academic commentary exist, beyond that accounted for by the Parker II court, to support
an individual rights interpretation of the Second Amendment. As well, public policy
supports an individual rights interpretation of the Second Amendment, and even if it did
not, the constitutional way to reduce the Second Amendment to a "dead letter" is not by
simply applying its text against intent and meaning. Therefore, as long as any of the
Plaintiffs are determined to have standing and if Parker II is not rendered moot with the
passage of the District of Columbia Personal Protection Act, Parker II should be
affirmed and the Second Amendment interpreted to protect an individual right to bear
arms consistent with the opinion of the Parker II court.
Drew A. Lagow*
357. Silveira I1, 328 F.3d at 570 (Kozinski, J., dissenting from denial of rehearing en banc).
358. U.S. Solicitor General Paul D. Clement recently advanced a "balancing" approach in his brief to the
Supreme Court regarding Parker I. See Br. for the U.S. as Amici Curiae at 8, Parker I1, 478 F.3d 370.
However, one critic argues this will "invite the Supreme Court to uphold an individual right to bear arms in
principle but then allow politicians and judges to gut it in practice." Wall Street J., Misfire at Justice,
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB120096108857304967.html?mod=opinionjoumalmain (Jan. 22, 2008).
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